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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Most Significant Relationship Rule
Tort choice of law problems are traditionally resolved by ref-
erence to the lex loci delicti--law of the place of the wrong.1 The
place of the wrong is generally considered to be "the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place." 2 The rule is a product of analytical jurisprudence3 and is
predicated -on the notion that since the plaintiff sues to enforce a
right resulting from his injury, the law of the state in which the in-
jury occurred should govern the existence of the right and the extent
of its vindiation.4 The rule has subsisted in this country amid both
praise and criticism. In recent years, its simple virtues of certainty,
ease of application, and predictability, though not totally ignored,5
have been submerged in waves of criticism directed at the unjust
results which frequently ensue from its application.6 Indeed, its
.arbitrary character and disregard for governmental interests in-
volved, in the situations it governs have provoked some courts to
dodge the rule,7 and others to abandon it." Recent criticism has de-
'See, e.g. Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §378 (1934). See generally 2 BEALE,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); GOODRCH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92
.(1949).
'Thus, where the plaintiff in Arkansas is injured by a rock blasted from
a quarry in some other state, the law of Arkansas will govern the substantive
.rights and liabilities of the parties. Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 13
S.W. 1092 (1890). Accord, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
See generally 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 378.2; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 93.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, Topic
1 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
'Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Loucks v. Standard
-Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See generally
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 1, § 93.
'25 ALBANY L. REv. 313, 317 (1961); Comment, 61 COLUm. L. REv.
1497, 1509, 1511 (1961); Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723, 727, 729-30 (1961);
12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 397 (1961); Comment, 15 RUTGERS L. R-v. 620,
624 (1961).
8 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv.
173 (1933); Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 CoLuM. L.
REv. 202 (1935); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1923); Currie, Conflict, Crisis, and Confusion in
New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1 (1963); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort,
64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in
the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 4 (1944).
'E.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), where the New York Court of Appeals, as an
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veloped the thought that perhaps a more flexible approach would
serve the ends of justice to a greater degree than the wholly me-
chanical approach, traditionally employed by most courts.'
One of the more significant areas of criticism directed at the lex
loci delicti approach involves its application to so-called multi-state
torts-situations in which the alleged tortious conduct and conse-
quent injury occur in different jurisdictions.' 0 In Lowe's North
Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.," the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting the North Carolina
alternative ground for decision, classified as a procedural matter the limita-
tion of damages recoverable in an action arising out of the wrongful death
of a New York citizen in Massachusetts, thus permitting the application of
the law of the forum rather than that of the place of the wrong. Though the
New York court has subsequently retreated from this position, Davenport v.
Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), the consti-
tutionality of the New York court's refusal on other grounds to apply the
law of the place of the wrong has been upheld. Pearson v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (rehearing in banc), reversing 307
F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 912 (1963). Cf. Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
'Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960); Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H.
1963); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wisc. 2d 130, 95
N.W.2d 814 (1959). Cf. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962);
Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Levy v.
Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928).
'The American Law Institute is presently considering a modification of
the rigid rule embodied in the original Restatement in favor of a more flex-
ible rule which provides that "The local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines
their rights and liabilities in tort." REsTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF
LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). It is interesting to note that the
Institute considers the state in which the injury occurs to have the most sig-
nificant relationship in the majority of tort situations. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 379, comment b at 4 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
'"Assume that under the law of State X, an actor is liable for damage
willfully or negligently caused by fire, whereas under the law of State I, an
actor is absolutely liable for any damage caused by fire. D starts a fire in State
X which spreads and damages the property of P located in State Y. Assume
that D neither willfully nor negligently caused the damage. A court sitting
in State Z, following the lex loci delicti approach, will apply the law of State
Y in determining whether D must compensate P for his loss. Thus, whereas
D was completely in compliance with the law of the state in which he acted,
he will nevertheless have to respond in damages. The result is criticized in
Cook, Tort Liability and The Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUM. L. Rvv. 202, 207
(1935).
1 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963).
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choice of law rule,"' held that the existence of a cause of action re-
sulting from defendant's alleged negligent conduct in Pennsylvania
and plaintiff's consequent injury in North Carolina would be de-
termined by reference to the law of that state having the most sig-
nificant relationships with the events constituting the alleged tort
and with the parties. Plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, pur-
suant to loan negotiations with a third party, applied to defendant,
a Pennsylvania insurance company, for a 200,000 dollar policy
insuring the life of its president. The results of medical examina-
tions conducted in North Carolina, together with other application
forms filled out in North Carolina, were mailed to defendant and
received at its home office in Pennsylvania by October 14, 1960.
On October 20, 1960, plaintiff was notified that defendant had de-
clined to issue a 200,000 dollar policy, but would issue a 50,000
dollar policy instead. Plaintiff accepted the offer of a 50,000 dol-
lar policy, at the same time requesting defendant to endeavor to
increase the amount of coverage on the policy. Two days later,
plaintiff's president died in North Carolina. Plaintiff instituted
suit in the Middle District Court of North Carolina to recover
200,000 dollars for defendant's alleged negligent delay in acting
upon plaintiff's application for insurance. It was conceded in the
District Court that such a cause of action was recognized in North
Carolina,'3 but not in Pennsylvania. 4 The District Court concluded
"2A federal court in a diversity suit must follow the substantive law of
the state in which it sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937). A
state's conflict of laws rules are considered a part of its substantive law for
this purpose. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
" In Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185 N.C. 121, 116 S.E. 266
(1923), appealed on other grounds 186 N.C. 763, 119 S.E. 172 (1923), a
cause of action was recognized for negligent failure of an insurance agent to
deliver the policy to the applicant once the application had been accepted.
In the Fox case, the Court hinted that an action might be maintained for
negligent delay in acting upon the application itself. Id. at 124, 116 S.E. at
268 (dictum). This dictum was reiterated in Rocky Mount Say. & Trust
Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 N.C. 552, 554-55, 160 S.E. 831, 832 (1931)
(dictum); cf. Bryant" v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 565, 117 S.E.2d
435 (1960). -There has never been a direct hol ding in North Carolina that a
cause of action may be maintained for negligent delay in acting upon an
application for life insurance. Indeed, a recent case casts doubt on the
continued vitality of the Fox doctrine that an action may be maintained for
-the agent's failure to deliver the policy within a reasonable time after its is-
suance. Blackman v. Liberty Life-Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 261, 123 S.E.2d 467
(1962). For a brief discussion of this' case, see Torts, Tenth Anmual Case
Law Survey, 41 N.C.L. REv. 512, 518 (1963). Thus, it is debatable whether
North Carolina recognizes a cause" of action for negligent delay in acting
19641]
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that under the North Carolina choice of law rule, the situation would
be governed by the law of the place of the tort. Applying this stand-
ard, it was reasoned that since the alleged negligence occurred in
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania was the place of the tort. Accordingly,
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.15
The Court of Appeals conceded that the North Carolina Supreme
Court had invariably followed the traditional lex loci delicti ap-
proach in resolving tort choice of law problems in which both con-
duct and injury occurred in the same jurisdiction. However, since
the multi-state aspect of the principal case presented considerations
not present in cases where both conduct and injury occur in one
state, 7 prior decisions in cases of the latter type were thought not
to be controlling here. Unable to determine from prior decisions the
rule which the North Carolina Supreme Court would probably ap-
ply if confronted with the multi-state problem,18 the Court of Ap-
upon an application for insurance. See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487,
511 (1953).
" Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A.2d 34
(1940). Accord, Shipley v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 199 F.Supp. 782 (W.D.
Pa. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1961).
" Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 206 F. Supp. 427, 430 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
" Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), 41 N.C.L. REv.
843; Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962); Kizer v. Bowman,
256 N.C. 565, 124 S.E.2d 543 (1962); Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc.,
255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961); Nix v. English, 254 N.C. 414, 119
S.E.2d 220 (1961); McCombs v. McLean Trucking Co., 252 N.C. 699, 114
S.E.2d 683 (1960); Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N.C. 667, 75
S.E.2d 732 (1953); Childress v. Johnson Motor Lines, 235 N.C. 522, 70
S.E.2d 558 (1952); Hill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 235 N.C. 705,
71 S.E.2d 133 (1952); Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 234 N.C. 512, 67 S.E.2d
492 (1951) ; Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949) ;
Morse v. Walker, 229 N.C. 778, 51 S.E.2d 496 (1949); Harper v. Harper,
225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945) ; Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26
S.E.2d 911 (1943); Baird v. Baird, 223 N.C. 730, 28 S.E.2d 225 (1943);
Russ v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 N.C. 715, 18 S.E.2d 130 (1942) ; Hale
v. Hale, 219 N.C. 191, 13 S.E.2d 221 (1941); Farfour v. Fahad, 214 N.C.
281, 199 S.E. 521 (1938); Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205 N.C. 292,
171 S.E. 100 (1933); Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 171 S.E. 82 (1933);
Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931): Harrison v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 168 N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915) ; Harrill v. South
Carolina & Georgia Extension Ry., 132 N.C. 655, 44 S.E. 109 (1903).
" The lex loci delicti approach is generally followed indiscriminately both
in situations where the conduct and injury occur in the same state and in
those cases involving conduct in one state and injury in another. See note 2
supra; REsTATEmENT, CoNFLIcr oF Laws § 377 (1934).
"8 There is at least one North Carolina case and language in other North
Carolina cases from which it might be concluded that the North Carolina
[Vol. 42
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peals rejected the lex loci delicti approach, and adopted the more
flexible rule. The relationship of Pennsylvania with the events and
the parties was determined to be more significant than that of North
Carolina, and hence the District Court's granting of summary judg-
ment for defendant was affirmed.' 9
Though the rule adopted by the Court of Appeals appears meri-
torious in abstract form,20 its application in the principal case is con-
Supreme Court would not abandon the lex loci delicti approach if confronted
with the facts of the principal case. One of the areas in which great strides
have been made away from the lex loci delicti approach is the area of inter-
spousal immunity from tort liability. Several courts have departed from
lex loci delicti in this area on the premise that the domicile of the
spouses has a greater governmental interest in this question, regardless
of where the conduct and injury occur. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
289 P.2d 218 (1955); Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963);
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wisc. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d
814 (1959). As recently as February 1, 1963, the North Carolina Supreme
Court was urged to overrule Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101
(1931), where it was held that the capacity of a wife to sue her husband
for injuries sustained in New Jersey would be dependent on the law of New
Jersey, the state in which the injuries were sustained. In Shaw v. Lee, 258
N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), 41 N.C.L. REv. 843, the court, confronted
with the above cited cases, refused to overrule the Howard case. In so do-
ing, the Court's adherence to lex loci delicti and the theory underlying the
rule was reaffirmed. In view of the Shaw decision, coupled with the fact
that the area in which it operates is fertile ground for conflict of laws revo-
lution, it is indeed doubtful that the North Carolina Supreme Court would
abandon lex loci delicti if confronted with the facts of the principal case. See
also Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 262, 34 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1945), where
it is stated: "The actionable quality of the defendant's conduct in inflicting
injury upon the plaintiff must be determined by the law of the place where
the injury was done." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C.
360, 362, 26 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1943), where the Restatement version of lex
loci delicti is quoted with approval.
19 Two cases have split on the same factual situation. Killpack v. National
Old Line Ins. Co., 229 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956) (applying the law of the
state in which the insurer's home office was located); Mann v. Policyholders'
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W.2d 853 (1952) (applying the law
of the plaintiff's domicile).
The outcome of the litigation is somewhat ironic from the plaintiff's
point of view. The plaintiff argued in the District Court that the lex loci
delicti approach should be abandoned and the law of the state with the most
significant relationships applied. The District Court did not agree, and ap-
plying the lex loci delicti approach, held Pennsylvania to be the place of the
wrong. It seems that a good argument could have been made that plaintiff
sustained its injury in North Carolina, thus requiring application of North
Carolina law under lex loci delicti. Finally, the plaintiff persuaded the Court
of Appeals to abandon lex loci delicti, only to have Pennsylvania selected as
the state with the more significant relationships.
" It is not the purpose of this note to compare the merits, and demerits
of the lex loci delicti rule and the rule adopted in the principal case. They
are thoroughly expounded in the articles cited in notes 5 & 6 supra.
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fusing and productive of few, if any, guidelines to assist the prac-
ticing attorney in evaluation of future fact situations." Particularly
perplexing is the disposition of the various factors urged in .support
of the plaintiff's contention that North Carolina law should have
been applied. The plaintiff advanced in its favor the fact that it was
domiciled and engaged in business in North Carolina, the fact that
its president whose life was sought to be insured lived and died in
North Carolina, and the fact that the injury, an indispensable element
of the tort, occurred in North Carolina. Instead of analyzing these
factors with the view *of determining whether they tended to give
North Carolina a more significant relationship with the events and
the parties, the Court of Appeals seemed more concerned with
whether these factors warranted the conclusion that the tort com-
plained of happened in North Carolina. Granted, the fact that the
tort happened in a particular state might be critical in evaluating
whether that state has a more significant relationship with the events
and the parties than some other state. Nevertheless, the mere state-
ment that the factors urged by the plaintiff would not support a con-
clusion that the tort happened in North Carolina hardly seems dis-
positive of whether or not these same factors are sufficient to give
North Carolina a more significant relationship with the events and
the parties than Pennsylvania.2
Four factors were enumerated as justifying the conclusion that
Pennsylvania had a more significant relationship with the events
and the parties than North Carolina: the application was sent to
the home office in Pennsylvania; all information relative to the policy
was obtained through or sent to the Pennsylvania office; an appli-
cation for a policy of that size could only be acted upon at the Penn-
sylvania office; it was in Pennsylvania that the application was
finally acted upon. In short, the events leading up to and constituting
the alleged delay were determined by the Court of Appeals to be
"The sole guideline furnished by the Court of Appeals is this statement:
"The relafiv'e weight due particular factors will vary from case to case, ind
the court must judge the totality of contacts of the states concerned with the
parties and the subject matter." 319 F.2d at 473.
" The most favorable interpretation of the court of appeals' treatment is
that these factors would not justify the conclusion that the injury occurred
in North Carolina. It would seem that the plaintiff was deprived in North
Wilkesboro, North Carolina, of the opportunity to obtain insurance on the
life of its president. If the injury occurred elsewhere, then where, and why
are that state's contacts not considered ?
[Vol. 42
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the critical factors, and the mere fact of their physical occurrence in
Pennsylvania warranted the conclusion that Pennsylvania's relation-
ship was the more significant.
Pennsylvania's selection in the principal case as the state with the
more significant relationship seems to be based solely on that state's
preponderance of physical contacts with the events and the parties.
The opinion is totally lacking in analysis of these physical contacts
in the light of possible governmental interests involved. In vivid
contrast is the New York Court of Appeals' treatment in Babcock
v. Jackson."3 In the Babcock case, plaintiff and defendant, both New
York residents, had embarked upon a weekend trip to Canada in
defendant's automobile. While driving in the Province of Ontario,
a collision, allegedly caused by defendant's negligence, resulted in
injury to the plaintiff. Defendant, assuming that Ontario law ap-
plied since both conduct and injury occurred in that province, inter-
posed the Ontario guest statute in bar of plaintiff's suit brought in
New York.2 4 The New York Supreme Court agreed with de-
fendant's position and dismissed the action, the Appellate Division
affirming. The Court of Appeals, applying a choice of law rule sim-
ilar to that adopted in the principal case, reversed. The New York
Court of Appeals initially outlined the relative physical contacts of
both New York and Ontario, emphasizing that analysis of the con-
tacts could only be made in light of the ultimate issue to be de-
cided-whether a guest passenger may sue his host for injuries sus-
" 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The New
York Court of Appeals has pioneered the revolution in the field of conflict
of laws. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (refusing to apply the law of the place of the
wrong with respect to the limitation of damages recoverable by reason of the
wrongful death in Massachusetts of a New York citizen); Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (abandoning the traditional rule that
the law of the place where a contract is made controls all issues as to its
execution, interpretation or validity, whereas the law of the place of per-
formance controls matters connected with performance). See also Haag v.
Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559-60, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69
(1961). See generally Currie, Conflict, Crisis, and Confusion in New York,
1963 DUKE L.J. 1 (1963).
2 The Ontario guest statute, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960),
instead of requiring proof of gross negligence which is required by most
American guest statutes, flatly precluded recovery by a guest under any con-
ditions. The New York Court of Appeals was apparently influenced by the
fact that the Ontario statute was without parallel in the United States. See
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, n.13, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 & n.13, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 & n.13 (1963).
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tained during the guest-host relationship. 5 New York's contacts
were said to stem from a guest-host relationship between New York
citizens originating and intended to terminate in New York and an
accident arising out of the negligent operation of an automobile li-
censed and undoubtedly insured in New York. On the other hand,
Ontario's sole contact with the situation was the fact that the acci-
dent occurred there. The public policies of both New York and On-
tario were then weighed vis-A-vis the issue involved. It was em-
phasized that the New York legislature had repeatedly refused to
enact legislation limiting the right of a guest to recover for injuries
inflicted by his host. This refusal was deemed to evidence a policy
of compensation in such cases, and no reason could be found to limit
the implementation of this policy to accidents occurring within the
borders of New York. On the other hand, Ontario's policy as re-
flected in its guest statute was the prevention of fraudulent claims
by passengers, in collusion with their drivers, against insurance com-
panies. This policy was thought to be directed at such claims as-
serted against Ontario defendants and their insurance carriers.
Reasoning from this, it was determined that Ontario could have no
valid legislative interest in whether fraudulent claims were asserted
by New York plaintiffs against New York defendants and their
insurance carriers. Thus, having determined that New York had a
greater governmental interest in the subject matter of the litiga-
tion, the Court of Appeals applied New York law in resolution of
the dispute.
The difference in the approach taken by the Babcock court and
that followed in the principal case is readily apparent. Lowe's seems
to reflect the view that the relationship of the state having the greater
total of physical contacts with the events and the parties would, a
fortiori, be more significant than that of the other state. On the
other hand, the Babcock court reached its decision by determining
which government, because of its physical contacts, had a greater
governmental interest in the subject matter of the litigation. This
was accomplished by initially investigating the policies of each gov-
ernment as expressed in the conflicting laws, and then weighing the
"5 It was pointed out that different considerations would be involved "had
the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his
car at the time of the accident." Id. at -, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 750-51.
[Vol. 42
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interest of each in the vindication of its policy in the light of the
physical contacts with the events and the parties. Concededly, in the
absence of conflicting statutory pronouncement on the substantive
issue in litigation, the facts of the principal case do not lend them-
selves as readily to such a governmental-interest analysis as did the
facts of the Babcock case. Nevertheless, the degree of significance
to be attached to each state's physical contacts might be assessed by
comparing policies reflected in general laws relative to dealings be-
tween insurance companies and individuals, with a view toward
determining whether either state, because of its physical contacts,
would have a greater interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
Investigation might reveal a Pennsylvania policy of protecting in-
surance companies from claims arising out of preliminary negotia-
tions with applicants for insurance. Such a policy would certainly
give Pennsylvania an interest in any dispute arising out of pre-
liminary negotiations between a domiciliary company and an appli-
cant for insurance. On the other hand, investigation might reveal
a North Carolina policy designed to protect its citizens in their deal-
ings with foreign insurance companies.2" Since the plaintiff in the
principal case was a North Carolina citizen, the existence of such a
policy would also seem to give North Carolina an interest in the
litigation. Especially would this be true if the defendant were li-
censed to do business in North Carolina, in which case North
Carolina's interest in the defendant's conduct while dealing with a
North Carolina applicant for insurance would seem to be paramount
to that of any other state, regardless of where the conduct com-
plained of occurred.
Perhaps, an alternate method might be employed to assess the
" Consider the following as possible evidence of such a policy: "All con-
tracts of insurance on property, lives, or interests in this State shall be
deemed to be made therein, and all contracts of insurance the applications
for which are taken within the State shall be deemed to have been made
within this State and are subject to the laws thereof." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-28 (1960); "This is true although the insurance company may under
its charter be allowed privileges which are contrary to the statutes in this
State." Wilson v. Supreme Conclave, 174 N.C. 628, 94 S.E. 443 (1917);
"It is unlawful for any company to make any contract of insurance upon or
concerning any property or interest or lives in this State, or with any resi-
dent thereof, or for any person as insurance agent or insurance broker to
make, negotiate, solicit, or in any anmner aid in the transaction of such
insurance, unless and except as authorized under the provisions of this
chapter." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-29 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
19641
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significance of each state's physical contacts. This method would
entail an examination into the basic purpose of the tort rule in-
volved. If it were determined that the basic purpose of the tort rule
is to deter or prevent hazardous conduct, then the state in which the
conduct occurred would generally have a greater interest in the ap-
plication of its law. On the other hand, if the tort rule were pri-
marily designed for the protection of a class of persons as opposed
to the prevention of hazardous conduct; then the state in which the
injury was suffered would generally have a greater interest in the
application of its law. Though this method of evaluating contacts is
suggested by the American Law Institute, the Institute is careful
to point out that this method ordinarily will be of little assistance,
since most tort rules involve elements of both prevention of hazardous
conduct and protection of the individual." Nevertheless, this method
would seem to be peculiarly adaptable to the facts of the principal
case. The disparity of bargaining power existing between individuals
and insurance companies has been recognized as justifying both
judicial and legislative protection of the individual. 28 Though the
rationale employed by those courts which recognize a cause of action
for negligent delay in acting upon an application for insurance
varies,2" the motivating factor underlying those decisions is a desire
to ameliorate "the insecure fortune of an individual pitted against
the security of an actuary table."8 0 Since the plaintiff is domiciled
in North Carolina, and since the injury complained of presumably
occurred there, it would seem reasonable, on this basis, to argue that
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379, comment c at 9
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
28 See Rocky Mount Say. & Trust Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 N.C.
552, 160 S.E. 831 (1931).
"° Duffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913) (in-
surance companies are affected with a public interest); Bekken v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940)
(negotiations for insurance are unlike negotiations for other contracts due to
disparity of bargaining power); Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co.,
86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912) (Nature of risk against which insurance
sought behooves prudent man to act with diligence); Columbian Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923) (implied contract
between applicant and insurer that latter will act within a reasonable time) ;
Strand v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (1927) (un-
reasonable delay may deprive applicant of opportunity to obtain insurance
elsewhere).
"'Rocky Mount Sav. & Trust Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 N.C. 552,
554, 160 S.E. 831, 832 (1931).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's interest in the subject matter of litigation is greater
than that of Pennsylvania.
Many authorities consider the loss of the advantages inherent in
lex loci delicti a small price to pay for a conflict of laws rule which
would permit greater recognition of governmental interests. It is
hoped that if, and when, the North Carolina Supreme Court accedes
to this position, the reason for abandonment of the traditional rule
will not be ignored in application of the new.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.
Consent Judgment-Reservation of Rights Against
Third Party-Release
In a recent North Carolina case,' plaintiff passenger brought an
action against two defendants as joint tortfeasors for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile collision. While the action was pending the
plaintiff entered into a covenant not to sue, -consent judgment and
satisfaction of that judgment with A. Both the covenant not to sue and'
the consent judgment reserved the rights of the plaintiff against the
other defendant, B, a corporation. In the pending action B- pleaded
that the transactions constituted, a release of one of the two joint
tortfeasors and therefore barred further recovery against the de-
fendant corporation. The jury found that the transactions consti-
tuted a covenant not to sue and awarded damages. The trial judge
set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial at which the
transactions were concluded to be a release. The court affirmed this
decision stating that the agreement, consent judgment -and satis-
faction extinguished the cause of action notwithstanding the inten-
tion of the parties; therefore; the plaintiff was barred from further
recovery. This raises the question, of whether a consent judgment
should be given the same effect as a judgment after trial or whether
a consent judgment should be viewed merely as a contract approved
by the court, thereby allowing the court to look behind the agree-
ment and determine whether the intention of the parties has been
carried out.
When a person is injured by the negligence of joint tortfeasors,
he may elect to sue them either jointly or individually.' There has
'Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843.(1963).
2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 882 (1939).
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